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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) 15th UNGA Session: The Soviet press continued its build-up of N.S.Khrushchev's "peace mission" to the United Nations and attempted to convey a picture of the West in a confused and uncertain state at the prospect of Khrushchev's presence at the UNGA, of the Soviet retention of the initiative, and of world-wide public support for Soviet disarmament proposals.

The announced US restriction of Khrushchev's movements to Manhattan while he is at the UNGA were portrayed as a petty action of the US Government, which is unable to produce any effective response to the challenge of Khrushchev's presence at the UN.

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) Congo developments continued to be reported in the Soviet press largely in terms of continuing imperialist plots, connived in by UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, to overthrow the Lumumba regine. The other Congolese protagonists Kasavubu, Ileo, Mobutu were all denounced as traitors to the Congolese people in the pay of the imperialists. As for the Security Council proceedings, The US was said to be following the tactic of delaying substantive consideration of Congo while continuing feverishly to try to bring down Lumumba's government. Moscow propaganda also insisted that the African states, notably the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea, had disassociated themselves from the UN action and recognized only Lumumba as the legitimate authority in Congo.

Meanwhile, the Embassy learned from reliable sources that the Ghanaian Embassy in Moscow had on September 10 issued visas for the Congo to 500 Soviet citizens described as technicians and transport maintenance personnel. There was no indication by what route the Soviets planned to travel to the Congo or when they were scheduled to arrive there. Obviously their presence in Congo would exacerbate an already complicated problem and reinforce the Soviet effort to get a foothold in the new state.

3. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Ideological questions affecting Moscow-Peiping relations were at issue in the following developments:

a. An Indian CP resolution adopted at its September 4-7 Central Executive Committee meeting was summarized in Pravda (September 10). The Pravda summary suggested that the CPI was on Moscow's side of the ideological dispute. The resolution reiterated Soviet arguments on the non-inevitability of war due to basic changes in the correlation of forces between the two camps, the need for the broadest unity of the masses in order to prevent nuclear war, and the possibility of peaceful transition to Socialism. The CPI's qualified statement of support for the Indian government's foreign policy also seemed to have anti-Peiping connotations in the light of the border dispute.

b. A.I.Mukhitdinov's September 11 speech to a mass meeting in Hanoi was summarized in Pravda (September 13). The tone of his remarks suggested that the debate between Moscow and Peiping had become sharper.

Mukhitdinov was reported as saying that "many" delegations at the Vietnamese party congress had spoken of the need for preserving bloc unity, and that "many" endorsed the 20th and 21st CPSU congress decisions, the Moscow Declaration of 1957, and the Bucharest Communique as containing the "only" correct outline of the "tactical and strategic tasks" of the communist movement. One inference was that the Bucharest debate remained unresolved at Hanoi, and that strategy as well as tactics was involved.

c. A Problem of Peace and Socialism, Nov. 9, 1960, article commemorating the 40th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's "Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder" was larded with what seemed clearly to be reflections on Peiping's theory and practice, hints at the charges that are being bandied about in the ideological debate, and warnings as to what the Chinese Communists may expect in the way of Soviet counter-charges if they persist in their dissenting ways. The author of the article, one Leon Bor, inveighed against abstract theory divorced from life; wrote repetition of Marxist principles accompanied by inability to put them into practice; the tendency to confuse dreams with reality and blame the masses for failure; Trotskyite views about the inevitability of war and the inadmissibility of agreements with the imperialists; gloating over the "break-up of this ar that agreement on meeting" (presumably a barb at the Chinese attitude to the abortive summit meeting in Paris last May); and the danger of becoming "incomprehensible doctrinaires." The catalogue of charges, all of them applicable to Peiping, affords further evidence to support the view that the ideological gap between the Russian and Chinese Communists is, if anything, widening.

4. (CONFIDENTIAL) Iranian-Soviet Relations. An Embassy officer was told by an official of the Iranian Embassy in Moscow that the Soviet Ambassador was presently returning to Tehran after a lengthy absence from his post, that the propaganda war between the USSR and Iran is over, and that the Soviet press is publishing articles calling for friendship with Iran. The US Embassy has not noted anything in the nature of a marked change in treatment of Iran in the Soviet press. It would seem more accurate to say that the press has been largely silent on Iranian developments since the fall of the Eghbal Government, which was reported briefly in a tentatively optimistic way (WEEKA 36).

5. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Soviet Interest in Mongolia. Khrushchev and MPR Prime Minister Tsedenbal signed an economic aid agreement on September 9 providing for a fresh Soviet credit of 615 rubles and for Soviet technical assistance, specialists and workers to assist in Outer Mongolian economic development. The scale of Soviet aid to the MPR with its small population seems to go beyond the routine requirement of Soviet support for the development of an underdeveloped Bloc country and probably is aimed at consolidating the Soviet position in Mongolia at the expense of the Chicoms. It will serve at least to belittle previous Chicom credits and technical assistance and to contrast Soviet and Chicom capabilities for aiding the MPR in the future.

6. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Laotian Developments. The Soviet press has briefly reported the rebellion in Laos lead by former Defense Minister Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum. The press described these figures as anti-communist and pro-American and claimed the US is using them to overthrow the Government of Souvanna Phouma.

INTERNAL

7. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Leadership: With A.N.KOSYGIN's reappearance in the party-government leadership group which attended N.S.KHRUSHCHEV's departure from Moscow September 9 and L.I.BREZHNEV's activity as head of the Soviet delegation to former GDR President PIECK's funeral, only N.M.SHVERNIK and Ye. A. FURTSEVA of the Moscow-based, Party Presidium members have been absent from the scene long enough (since July) to arouse curiosity as to the state of their physical or political health. Both of these CC Presidium Members might well have been expected to attend the Central Committee Conference on Questions of Ideological Work September 6-9 (Central Press of September 10). In fact, to judge from the importance apparently being attributed to this conference, it seems rather strange that P.N.POSPELOV should be the only Presidium-level personage to attend. Even he is not reported to have addressed the conference, nor does the follow-up assessment of the conference (Pravda of September 14) mention Pospelov's presence. A.B.ARISTOV is apparently on vacation or unpublicized assignment (last noted as active August 12), and it was RSFSR Premier D.S.POLYANSKIY rather than CC RSFSR Bureau Deputy Chairman Aristov who journeyed to Kuybyshev for the opening of the Lenin Metallurgical Plant September 10. With Kosygin back at work, A.I.MIKOYAN seems to have started the vacation which he said was pending in a conversation last week. In any case, he has not been in evidence since Khrushchev's departure from Moscow.

8. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Central Committee "Ideological" Conference: The somewhat broader coverage of the September 6-9 Central Committee Conference on Questions of Ideological Work which was published in Pravda of September 14 actually adds little to the first report (Central Press of September 10). To judge from such other materials as an article by Moldavian CP Secretary Ye. POSTOVOY in Soviet Culture of September 15, the conference may well have been a stormy one featuring much sharp criticism of ideological and propaganda work deficiencies on the part of numerous organizations and individuals. It also seems increasingly unlikely that P.N.POSPELOV was the only person of CC CPSU Presidium stature to attend, particularly since so many of the Presidium members were in Moscow for Khrushchev's departure on September 9.

One important purpose of the conference was to bring into focus and add impetus to all of the various current campaigns related to developing the new "Communist Man," attacking forms of behavior and "thought" which run counter to this development or, more importantly, which detract from labor efficiency and discipline or which represent "dangerous bourgeois survivals," and to calling again for impressive improvements in the form and effectiveness of propaganda activity. In one sense, the conference was an accounting of progress along these lines since the January 9, 1960 Central Committee decree. (postanovleniye) "On the Tasks of Party Propaganda Under Current Conditions." Despite some gestures to the contrary, it is most evident that the lack of substantial progress has been disappointing and aggravating to the leadership. Regional and local meetings and conferences on the same or related themes have begun to be reported in the press. Those in the areas where the republic

parties were criticized (Kazakhstan, Armenia, Turkmenistan and Georgia) should reveal more on the extent and seriousness of the "deficiencies" and whether these may lead to or be used as an excuse for changes in party and other local leadership personnel.

9. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Protecting Public Order: "Druzhinniki": Flagrant violations of socialist morality and attempts to eradicate traces of the "old order" are frequently reported in connection with the campaign to build the new "Communist Man." Vechernayaya Moskva of September 13, for example, describes a Raikom Party meeting which discussed hooliganism and drunkenness in Gorkiy Park. The voluntary peoples "guards" (narodniye druzhinniki) are enlisted to combat this kind of public disturbance. Moskovskiy Komsomolets of September 15 claims that "tens of thousands" of young Moscovites have joined the druzhinniki to assist the militia. The paper admits that some misfits and misdirected persons have slipped into the ranks of these volunteers.

In general, the press makes it amply clear that the druzhinniki are now authorized to investigate nearly every kind of social disorder, including activities which could be expected to lead ultimately to public disorder! Present operations appear to be limited only by the degree of initiative possessed by the individual and the seemingly unlimited indulgence of the regular militia. Current activities include participation in "raids" on markets and distribution points, investigation of misuse of public property and assistance in the "anti-parasite" campaign. Publication of a "Handbook for Druzhinniki" which may regularize these activities has been announced but as yet the handbook has not appeared in Moscow bookshops.

10. (UNCLASSIFIED) CULTURAL NOTES:

Secretary of Union of Writers Dies. Secretary of the Board of the Union of Writers of the USSR Fedor Ivanovich PANFEROV died on September 10. A member of the CPSU since 1928, the importance attached to his death is indicated not only by the voluminous coverage given the event in the press, but by attendence at his wake by F.R. Kozlov, M.A. Suslov, and P.N. Pospelov.

Shostakovich Joins the Party. At a Party meeting of Moscow composers September 14, a certain "D. Shostakovich" was accepted as a candidate member of the Communist Party, according to Pravda of September 15. Evidently this is the renown composer whose works have for years been the center of a storm of both criticism and appreciation. (Shostakovich's most recent thoughts on artistic criticism were expressed in a September 7 Pravda article, "The Artist of Today.")

New Honorary Title Created: Merited Artist of the RSFSR. Filling a need in a "honor" and "pin" conscious land, the title "Honored Artist of the RSFSR" has been created by decree of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of September 10. The award can be given to theater decorators, folk-art and commerical art workers and the like on the basis of nomination from authorities as low as the raion level. Provision is made in the decree for taking the award back, presumably in the event of subsequent misbehavior or failure to maintain a "meritorious" level of performance.

Travelling Art Exhibition. Nearly 4,000 paintings, sculptures and other works of art taken from storage in the Tretyakovskaya and other central galleries are being despatched to 32 various museums in the USSR so that "millions of Soviet people living far from the capital will have access to these works of human genius."

ARMY

11. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) The first of the Motorized Army elements to participate in the November 7 parade was observed moving into Moscow on the weekend of September 10-11. Initial practice for vehicle drivers and commanders took place on Sadovoye Kol'tso at 2330 hours September 12; the equipment included: one unit of armored amphibious (4x4) recon vehicles, two units of motorized infantry in BTR 152 armored personnel carriers, one battery of BMD-20 rocket launchers, and one battery of 100mm field guns towed by armored tracked artillery tractors AT-P. No other equipment has been observed as yet. Student officers at military academies of various arms in Moscow were observed conducting dismounted parade drill. In the past, pre-parade preparations have begun approximately six weeks prior to the parade. The reason for starting eight weeks early this time is not determined; possibly the high command was not satisfied with the showing at the May Day parade.

For the Ambassador:

Robert I. Owen
First Secretary of Embassy

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